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FROM THE GROUP OF TWENTY TO THE
GROUP OF TWO:
THE NEED FOR HARMONIZING
DERIVATIVES REGULATION BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION
TESSA WHITE*
I
INTRODUCTION
Following the approval of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank) in July of 2010, U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Commissioner Bart Chilton wrote, “Now
that the U.S. has approved the largest financial regulatory reform ever
undertaken, it’s time for other nations to join in to ensure more efficient,
effective market systems. Here is what we know: free markets without sufficient
1
sideboards led to the global economic collapse.” Chilton began his position at
the CFTC in 2007, making him a firsthand witness to the financial crisis and the
2
subsequent rulemaking that ultimately resulted in Dodd–Frank.
Throughout his time at the Commission, Chilton consistently championed
3
the need for cooperation among different nations’ regulatory agencies. The
legislation itself stresses this need for international regulatory cooperation, with
§ 752 of Dodd–Frank specifically addressing international harmonization of
derivatives reform: “In order to promote effective and consistent global
regulation of contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery and options
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1. Bart Chilton, The Heavy Lift of Harmonization—CFTC’s Chilton, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2010),
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2010/09/24/opinion-the-heavy-lift-of-harmonizationcftcs-chilton/.
2. Gina Chon, Financial Reform Effort Disappoints Former CFTC Regulator, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Mar.
23,
2014,
5:24PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/26913de2-b10a-11e3-bbd400144feab7de.html#axzz2xaDN8J8S.
3. See, e.g., Chilton, supra note 1 (“Such communication between regulators at the international
level is critically important in the brave new world of global electronic markets.”).
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on such contracts, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall consult
and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on the establishment of
4
consistent international standards.” Moreover, the U.S. push for regulatory
cooperation in the financial realm did not stop with this legislation. In fact,
President Obama issued Executive Order 13,609 in 2012, specifically directing
agencies to focus on international regulatory cooperation in order to minimize
5
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. This executive order acts
as an additional legitimizing authority on the ability of agencies to cooperate
with their foreign counterparts and highlights the top priority given to achieving
6
global regulatory harmonization in the financial sector.
This calling for greater cooperation among regulators has become
7
increasingly common in the past twenty years, with the financial crisis of 2008
only escalating the momentum of international regulatory cooperation. In 2002,
Professor Kal Raustiala highlighted the growing need for communication
between regulators, writing that “[i]nterdependence among states—the linkages
8
between national economies and societies—has never been higher.” The crisis,
therefore, merely amplified awareness of this financial interconnectedness. In a
recent report on international financial reforms, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) stressed the consequences of a linked global
economy:
Cross-border interconnections in the financial markets and other factors helped
spread disruptions in the global financial system during the 2007–2009 financial crisis
and increased systemic risk at the national and international levels. For example, the
rise in the complexity and globalization of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives
contributed to economic growth but created interconnections that helped spread
9
disruptions quickly across markets and borders during the crisis.

As specifically identified in this GAO report, derivatives played a central
role in the financial crisis and were consequently a central focus of national
regulatory bodies in the aftermath. Because of their global nature, however, it

4. 15 U.S.C. § 8325(b) (2014).
5. Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26413 (May 4, 2012) (“In some cases, the differences
between the regulatory approaches of U.S. agencies and those of their foreign counterparts might not
be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete
internationally.”).
6. Reeve T. Bull, Developing a Domestic Framework for International Regulatory Cooperation,
78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015, at 50 (explaining the significance of President Obama’s
executive order: “EO 13,609 thus places a high priority upon a cross-border issue that many agencies
had largely neglected insofar as it was viewed as outside the ambit of their overall regulatory
missions.”).
7. Jonathan Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory Cooperation:
TTIP as a Learning Process toward a Global Regulatory Policy, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4,
2015, at 107 (“The trend toward international cooperation among regulators has become a significant
feature of regulatory policy in recent years.”).
8. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks
and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2002).
9. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-261, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORMS:
U.S. AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT REFORMS ii (2014),
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-261?source=ra (hereinafter GAO REPORT).
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quickly became clear that successful regulation of these financial products and
prevention of future systemic risk required improved, extensive international
cooperation. Already existing international organizations, such as the Group of
Twenty (G20) and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA), took immediate action to respond to the crisis. The most notable
response came from the G20, which has as its objective the coordination of
10
policy among its members.
The standards- and principles-based regulations set forth by these
organizations, however, require state implementation by specific governmental
agencies, and it is in this implementation process that the need for regulatory
cooperation is critical for a successful global regulatory regime of derivatives.
Despite being a champion of global regulatory cooperation, Chilton’s statement
above highlights the largely unilateral approach taken by the United States in
response to the 2008 financial crisis in passing Dodd–Frank, with U.S.
policymakers expecting other nations to follow in its regulatory path. Timothy
Geithner, former Secretary of the Treasury, highlighted this point in his
remarks at the International Monetary Conference in 2011, stating that “[t]he
United States has taken an important leadership role in comprehensive reform
of the over-the-counter derivatives market. Alignment with Europe and Asia is
11
essential.” Despite the United States’ history of success through unilateral
12
action, the regulation of derivatives is not an area in which acting alone will
ultimately lead to a desirable result.
This need for increased regulatory cooperation is quickly becoming
apparent with the 2012 passage of the European Market Infrastructure
Regulation (EMIR). “Europe’s contribution to the centralized reporting,
clearing, and enhanced transparency requirements demanded post-crash” that
“apes the US Dodd–Frank rules in many aspects,” yet leaves “some regional
differences still obfuscating the long-desired global harmony and opening up
13
the possibility of regulatory arbitrage.” Although both Dodd–Frank and
EMIR are based upon the same principles set forth by the G20 and both
attempt to achieve the same goals, the slight differences in regulation between
10. Id. at 6 (“The G20’s objectives are to coordinate policy among its members to achieve global
economic stability and sustainable growth; promote financial regulations that reduce risks and prevent
future financial crises; and modernize the international financial architecture.”).
11. Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks to the International Monetary
Conference (June 6, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1202.aspx.
12. Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes:
Governance without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 267 (2005).
[The] United States is best known for applying its law “extraterritorially” in a unilateral
manner, from the Helms–Burton Act regarding investments in Cuba, to the sanctions applied
in response to European assistance for the Soviet oil pipelines, to the application of U.S.
securities and antitrust law to conduct abroad, as in the Hartford Fire Insurance case. The
United States has typically applied its law without engaging in any collaboration or
coordination whatsoever.
13. Dan Barnes, Feature: EMIR Financial Markets Regulation Unfolds, BOBSGUIDE (Mar. 3,
2014),
http://www.bobsguide.com/guide/news/2014/Mar/3/feature-emir-financial-markets-regulationunfolds.html.
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the United States and the European Union create gaps in regulation that
market participants can take advantage of. As Weadon notes, “[t]he unintended
consequences of this uneven regulatory playing field include the concentration
of derivatives risk in the most hospitable jurisdictions and a competitive
disadvantage for U.S. financial firms. These risks are even more pronounced
14
when one considers that OTC derivatives activity is truly global in nature.”
Despite the success of the G20 in quickly responding to the 2008 financial
crisis, identifying important concerns raised by derivatives, and setting forth a
framework for improving the regulation of derivatives, this note argues that the
key to regulating derivatives and preventing a similar crisis in the future is the
harmonization of derivatives regulation through effective transgovernmental
networks, the most significant of which is that between the United States and
the European Union. Without such harmonization, governments incentivize
regulatory arbitrage that can result in the concentration of risk in jurisdictions
with more favorable or weaker legislation.
Part II provides a description of transgovernmentalism and explains the
relevance of this theory in regulating derivatives, noting specific attributes of
the derivatives market that sets it apart from other areas, such as securities
regulation, and makes it a sector requiring agency-to-agency communication
and cooperation. Part III provides a background on the global nature of the
2008 financial crisis and the response by the international community to the
risks posed by derivatives. Although part III notes the success of certain global
efforts, part IV uses the current gaps and inconsistencies between the United
States’ and the European Union’s regulation of derivatives to highlight the
critical need for regulatory cooperation and the strengthening of
transgovernmental networks. Part V discusses the consequences of a derivatives
regulatory regime that is not harmonized between the United States and the
European Union, paying particular attention to the risk of regulatory arbitrage
and the resulting concentration of risk. Notwithstanding the serious
consequences of failing to harmonize derivatives regulation, part VI
acknowledges the challenges and impediments to regulatory cooperation and a
harmonized regulatory regime; however, part VI concludes by noting the
agreement between the United States and the European Union to overcome
these impediments, focusing particularly on the current progress of the two
regimes in improving cooperation between their regulatory bodies. Finally, part
VII discusses common criticisms of harmonization and the merits of these
arguments, stressing that critiques of harmonization can be used by regulators
to avoid some of its pitfalls.

14. Benjamin M. Weadon, International Regulatory Arbitrage Resulting From Dodd–Frank
Derivatives Regulation, 16. N.C. BANK. INST. 249, 259 (2012).
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II
BECAUSE DODD–FRANK SAID SO: ACHIEVING INTERNATIONAL
HARMONIZATION OF DERIVATIVES REGULATION THROUGH
TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS
15

In a 2014 symposium at the New York University School of Law, a group
of practitioners and academics came together to present and discuss new
approaches to international regulatory cooperation in anticipation of this 2015
16
issue of Law and Contemporary Problems. Ten years prior, many of these
same individuals contributed to the journal’s issue on the emergence of global
17
administrative law, which was then an emerging field of legal theory and
practice. In this earlier symposium, authors discussed the global administrative
space, which includes “international institutions and transnational networks
involving both governmental and non-governmental actors, as well as domestic
administrative bodies that operate within international regimes or cause
18
transboundary regulatory effects.” Although Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye
19
set the groundwork of transgovernmentalism in the 1970s, the 2005 symposium
laid a solid foundation for the increasing attention to regulatory cooperation
across borders, and ten years later, the prevalence and support of global
20
administrative law and transnational regulatory networks has only grown.
Raustiala highlights this trend, noting,
[M]uch contemporary international cooperation is not inter-national at all, rather, it is
occurring among discrete, specialized agencies of governments. . . . These constituent
parts—especially regulatory agencies tasked with elaborating upon and enforcing the
laws that manage complex societies—are increasingly networking with their
counterparts abroad. In the process they are sharing information, ideas, resources, and
policies. Much of this agency-to-agency cooperation addresses domestic laws that, in a
21
globalizing world, have growing international salience.

Although this area of study and practice now plays an increasingly central
role in discussions of reform among international organizations and within
national regulatory bodies, the various methods of undertaking regulatory
15. Symposium on New Approaches to International Regulatory Cooperation, New York
University School of Law, Feb. 27–28 2014.
16. Richard Stewart, C. Boyden Gray, Jonathan Wiener, Alberto Alemanno, Robert Ahdieh,
Jeffrey Dunoff, David Zaring, Reeve Bull, Fernanda Nicola, Mariana Mora Prado, Francesca Bignami,
and Neysun Mahboubi.
17. See generally Symposium, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (2005).
18. Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword: Global Governance as Administration—National and
Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3 (2005).
19. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International
Organizations, 27 WORLD. POL. 39, 43 (1974) (introducing the theory of transgovernmentalism and
defining transgovernmental relations as “sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different
governments that are not controlled by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those
governments”).
20. Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Cooperation and Competition: The Search for Virtues, in
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 167,
202 (George A. Bermann et al., eds., 2001).
21. Raustiala, supra note 8, at 3–4.
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cooperation and contexts in which it arises have resulted in some
misunderstandings. Reeve Bull and Adam Schlosser note this confusion
surrounding regulatory cooperation in the trade and regulatory context, writing,
“[d]espite the widespread support for greater regulatory cooperation, however,
some confusion exists as to what calling for enhanced cooperation means,”
specifically highlighting that “regulatory cooperation is not a synonym for
‘harmonization.’ Harmonization, merely one of many activities that can be
classified as regulatory cooperation, involves the creation of an identical
22
regulation or standard across two jurisdictions.” Harmonization also
encompasses other forms such as mutual recognition of regulations across
borders, information exchange, and regulatory convergence.
This distinction between harmonization and regulatory cooperation is
significant, especially in regard to the regulation of derivatives. As discussed
above, Dodd–Frank § 752, titled International Harmonization, calls for the
more attenuated form of regulatory cooperation, “specifically requir[ing] the
SEC, the CFTC, and the prudential regulators to consult and coordinate with
foreign regulatory authorities on the establishment of consistent international
23
standards” with respect to the regulation of OTC derivatives in order to
promote consistent global regulation. Although this harmonization of
regulation—in which standards must closely align and achieve consistency
between different regulatory bodies—is not a viable, nor preferable, option in
24
many areas, in the regulation of derivatives, harmonization is necessary in
order to effectively eliminate the systemic risk that accompanies that market.
The three main reasons for the rise of transgovernmental networks
demonstrate the networks’ particular relevance to derivatives regulation: (1)
technological innovation, (2) the expansion of the regulatory state, and (3)
25
globalization (economic interdependence). The risk posed by derivatives stems
from the technological innovation behind the creation of new financial
products, which are significantly complex and resultantly make regulation
extremely difficult. Moreover, the systemic nature of the risk created by
derivatives is the result of an increasingly global economy, which again can be
attributed partially to technology; as Chilton stresses, “[o]ne of the reasons our
financial markets and our economies are so interconnected—and we need some
26
harmonization—is because of technology.”
22. Adam C. Schlosser & Reeve T. Bull, Regulatory Cooperation in the TTIP, REGBLOG (Aug.
27, 2013), http://www.regblog.org/2013/08/27/27-schlosser-reeve-ttip/.
23. Financial Regulatory Reform: The International Context: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 112th Cong. 18 (June 16, 2011) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm’n)
(speaking on the international implications of the Dodd–Frank Act, specifically regarding the
regulation of OTC derivatives and foreign investor adviser registration).
24. See Schlosser & Bull, supra note 22 (noting harmonization “may make sense in select cases
and sectors, but is frequently not desirable or even possible in many others”).
25. See Raustiala, supra note 8, at 12–13 (describing the three key factors, saying that
“[t]echnological innovation is thus one major factor behind the rise of networks. A second is the rise of
the regulatory state itself”).
26. Bart Chilton, Comm’r, Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC: Stopping
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Due to the increasing emphasis on the regulatory state, the response to the
financial crisis and the threat presented by derivatives was to bring these
products under increased regulation and scrutiny, which requires extensive
27
regulatory cooperation globally. The CFTC’s approach to the regulation of
derivatives must strive for international harmonization and closely align with
the actions of regulatory bodies in other jurisdictions, using transgovernmental
networks to produce a regulatory regime of derivatives that will not allow for
regulatory arbitrage or foster a concentration of risk due to gaps in regulation.
III
THE GLOBAL NATURE OF THE CRISIS, DERIVATIVES, AND REFORM: LIMITS
OF THE G20 IN THE REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES AND THE NEED FOR
TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS
The 2008 financial crisis highlighted both the interconnectedness of the
various major economies and the derivatives market in particular, and the
28
consequences of allowing these contracts to go largely unregulated globally.
Although scholars and professionals debate whether derivatives played the
primary role in the financial crisis, they widely agree that derivatives did cause
significant damage and remain a source of risk. The Atlantic Council highlights
this risk in its 2013 report on transatlantic reform, noting, “From the AIG crisis
to JPMorgan’s $6 billion loss in its ‘London Whale’ trades, OTC derivatives
have shown themselves to be quick and active transmitters of risk contagion
29
between jurisdictions.”
In addition to demonstrating the systemic risk posed by derivatives, the
global nature of the crisis demonstrated the lack of coordination among states
to even identify such risk. As Duke University School of Law Professor Steven
Schwarcz notes,
The 2008 financial crisis also involved a failure to see system-wide correlations—not
only the tight interconnectedness among banks and non-bank financial firms but also
the tight interconnectedness between financial firms and markets. What made the

Stammering—Overcoming Obstacles in Financial Regulatory Reform, in COMPENDIUM (Mar. 29, 2011),
http://commoditymkts.wordpress.com/2011/03/29/cftc-stopping-stammering-overcoming-obstacles-infinancial-regulatory-reform-commissioner-bart-chilton/#more-1393.
27. Former Secretary Geithner stressed the need for a global approach and reiterated Dodd–
Frank’s mandate of transgovernmentalism, stating,
The regulators are independent agencies, with independent mandates. Where Congress has
given them the room to adopt common approaches, they need to do so, both so that we reduce
the change of risk shifting among institutions subject to their different jurisdictions, but also so
that we improve the chances of promoting a uniform global approach that does not damage
U.S. firms.
Geithner, supra note 11.
28. OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS GRP., REPORT ON AGREED UNDERSTANDINGS TO
RESOLVING CROSS-BORDER CONFLICTS, INCONSISTENCIES, GAPS AND DUPLICATIVE
REQUIREMENTS 1, (Mar. 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/
odrgreport.pdf.
29. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, THE DANGER OF DIVERGENCE: TRANSATLANTIC FINANCIAL REFORM
& THE G20 AGENDA, 29 (2013).
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financial crisis so devastating was
that these failures combined to facilitate the
30
transmission of economic shocks.

Current CFTC Commissioner Scott O’Malia also addressed this inability of
the international community to take a bird’s-eye view of the OTC derivatives
market. In a keynote address on March 25, 2014, O’Malia highlighted that the
“urgency for a holistic view of the financial markets, without borders, was
underscored by how the financial crisis caught the world by surprise. Data that
could have identified systemic risk was fragmented across regulators and
31
nations.”
As a result of this clear inability to identify the significant risks presented by
derivatives and cooperate in the regulation thereof prior to 2008, international
organizations and standard-setting bodies immediately responded to the crisis
by discussing the future of derivatives regulation and by coordinating responses.
This international response was supported by individual states as it became
apparent that domestic regulation alone would no longer sufficiently incubate a
state from financial turmoil, especially in the derivatives context. Geithner’s
remarks to the international financial community highlight this reaction among
states: “Just as we have global minimum standards for bank capital—expressed
in a tangible international agreement—we need global minimum standards for
margins on uncleared derivatives trades. Without international consensus, the
32
broader cause of central clearing will be undermined.”
This broad acceptance of international coordination paved the way for the
G20’s quick response to the financial crisis. Founded in 1999 and considered the
“‘premier’ organization for international economic cooperation, the Group of
Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors . . . provides a forum
for banking and finance ministers from . . . nineteen of the largest or fastest33
developing economies to meet,” with the European Union being the twentieth
member. In 2008, President Obama and the other G20 leaders met in
Washington, D.C. with the purposes of creating a framework to prevent future
34
financial crises and establishing principles to guide financial regulatory reform.
This summit and others have been followed by G20 leaders sending these
agreed-upon reforms to the appropriate national authority within their state.
Moreover, in 2009, the G20 established the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in
order “to coordinate and promote implementation of the financial reforms,
which typically involves standard-setting bodies developing international
standards (for example, principles, policies, or guidance), followed by

30. Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. L.
REV. 815, 828 (2012).
31. Scott O’Malia, Comm’r, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Keynote Address at the
SWIFT Institute, the SWIFT’s Standards Forum, and the London School of Economics and Political
Science Conference: The Future of Financial Standards (Mar. 25, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaomalia-34).
32. Geithner, supra note 11.
33. Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327, 357–58 (2010).
34. GAO REPORT, supra note 9.

WHITE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2015]

1/8/2016 2:41 PM

FROM THE GROUP OF TWENTY TO THE GROUP OF TWO

309

jurisdictions voluntarily adopting rules or policies consistent with such
35
standards, either through legislation or regulations.”
At the 2009 G20 summit in Pittsburgh, the reform agenda centered on OTC
derivatives, with the leaders agreeing: “[a]ll standardized OTC derivative
contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where
appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the
latest.” And that “OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade
repositories” and “[n]on-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher
36
capital requirements.”
The agreement of the G20 leaders on core components of OTC derivatives
reform marked a significant milestone. However, this early success has largely
been marred by problems with implementation and the consequent
discrepancies existing between member states’ derivatives regulatory regimes.
First, although several jurisdictions, including the United States, have made
progress in implementing the G20 reforms to OTC derivatives, according to a
GAO report published in April 2014, most reforms have yet to be implemented
37
in member states. This variation is notable; the report highlights that
according to a September 2013 progress report, only the United States reported
having rules at least partly in effect to implement the G20 reforms requiring
derivatives to be centrally cleared, traded on organized trading platforms, and
reported to trade repositories, while many other jurisdictions reported having rules in
effect for only some of these reforms or adopted or proposed legislation to implement
38
the reforms.

The lack of consistency in national OTC derivatives regulation legislation
and the continued inability of many member states to fully implement these
reforms in a timely manner demonstrate the limits of international
organizations in single-handedly motivating states to take action with regard to
derivatives reform.
Despite the G20’s success in creating an international consensus in general
OTC derivatives reform and regulation, several weaknesses highlight the need
to shift focus from global policy setting to transgovernmental networks in which
regulatory agencies take the reins away from G20 leaders and work together to
actually produce the necessary legislation. First, as an international
organization, the G20 lacks true enforcement mechanisms. Brummer notes this
limitation, writing, “[T]he G-20 communiqués are not enforceable under
international law. Instead, disciplinary mechanisms within the G-20 are largely
39
reputational.” The same constraint applies to the FSB, which, despite being
“tasked with ensuring coordination in regulation among the G20 members, has

35. Id.
36. GRP. OF TWENTY, LEADERS’ STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, 9 (Sept. 24–25 2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-G20/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders
_statement_250909.pdf.
37. GAO REPORT, supra note 9.
38. Id.
39. Brummer, supra note 33, at 359.
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no powers to force the United States or other countries to row back on national
40
reforms and relies on peer pressure for persuasion.” Second, regardless of the
G20’s ability to successfully encourage the implementation of the standards
agreed upon in the regulation of derivatives, slight deviations between national
legislation can lead to devastating consequences, the most prominent of which
is regulatory arbitrage. The necessary detail required for the harmonization of
derivatives regulation cannot be achieved solely through standards- and
principles-setting, even on a truly global level.
In fact, in the most recent G20 communiqué, the G20 leaders themselves
noted that communication between regulatory bodies within their states is
critical for successful legislation, with a strong push for meaningful peer reviews
41
of OTC derivatives reform. This renewed focus on transgovernmental
regulatory cooperation, where the specific agencies communicate directly with
each other in order to achieve increased harmonization, finds significant
support. Bull discusses this growing emphasis on G20 peer reviews, noting that
some academics view these as an important tool because they can be used to
“help deepen commitment to the standards by domestic officials by holding
member jurisdictions accountable not only to an international body but also to
42
each other.” Again, these peer reviews face similar challenges to the
43
international financial standards as they are not binding; however, in certain
contexts this transgovernmental communication can lead to more meaningful
results in truly harmonizing the regulation of derivatives.
These weaknesses highlight the need for strong transgovernmental
networks, with national regulatory bodies communicating with each other
directly, rather than indirectly through their leaders. The most notable and
crucial transgovernmental network in the derivatives regulation is between the
United States and the European Union.
IV
THE GROUP OF TWO: DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE DERIVATIVES
REGULATORY REGIMES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
Both the United States and the European Union claim to have passed
legislation that fulfills the G20’s agenda concerning the regulation of
derivatives. The United States enacted the goals and policies set forth by the

40. Huw Jones, Andy Bruce & David Evans, Update 1-FSB’s Carney Says to Crack Too-Big-toFail
Bank
Barriers
by
Dec,
REUTERS,
(Mar.
31,
2014,
3:55
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/31/g20-fsb-carney-idUSL5N0MS4QV20140331.
41. GRP. OF TWENTY, COMMUNIQUÉ: MEETING OF FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK
GOVERNORS IN SYDNEY 2 (Feb. 22–23 2014) (“We commit to cooperate across jurisdictions with a
renewed focus on timely and consistent implementation supported by meaningful peer reviews,
including OTC derivatives reform.”).
42. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 48.
43. Id.
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44

G20 in Title VII of Dodd–Frank. Also known as the Wall Street Transparency
and Accountability Act, “Title VII of Dodd–Frank focuses exclusively on
remedying a host of problems surrounding the previously unregulated OTC
derivatives products that wreaked havoc on major financial and insurance
industry companies including Lehman Brothers and American International
45
Group.” Title VII adopts a bifurcated regulatory structure, with the CFTC in
charge of the regulation of swaps and participants in the swaps market, and with
46
the SEC as the agency responsible for security swaps and market participants.
Two years later, the European Union promulgated the EMIR in order to set
forth the policies agreed upon by the G20 leaders, and this legislation, along
with European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) technical standards,
47
contains “the thrust of the G20 agenda.” As Barnes notes, EMIR’s “primary
function is to deliver Europe’s interpretation of the agreed G20 mandate agreed
on 25 September 2009, to make over-the-counter . . . derivatives trading less
48
systemically risky.” Moreover, in February 2014, the European Union’s
Permanent Committee of Representatives approved both the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) and the Markets in Financial
49
Instruments Regulation (MiFIR), legislative proposals that had been debated
50
since 2011. Together, EMIR, MiFID II, and MiFIR set the framework for
trading derivatives, and this “package of legislation governing derivatives
51
regulation originated” from the G20 accord.
Although Title VII of Dodd–Frank, EMIR, MiFID II, and MiFIR all in fact
comply with the standards agreed upon at the 2009 summit, the respective
legislations of the United States and the European Union differ enough to
change the behavior of actors in the derivatives market:
A comparison of Title VII of Dodd–Frank and the relatively similar European Union
proposal for OTC derivatives regulation, known as the European Market
Infrastructure Regulation . . . , reveals that even slight variations can have a significant
effect on the risk for regulatory arbitrage and competitive
imbalance for U.S. based
52
financial institutions competing in the global marketplace.

In this part, this article first addresses several explanations for why
44. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 30.
45. Weadon, supra note 14, at 250.
46. Id. at 258.
47. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 30.
48. Barnes, supra note 13.
49. Jonathan Herbst & Hannah Meakin, MiFID II/MiFIR Series–Impact on Commodities and
Commodity Derivatives Trading, Norton
Rose Fulbright LLP (Mar. 20, 2014),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=88e9372d-c1bf-4259-b9f5-44c4c889d765.
50. Id. (“[In] 2011 the European Commission published legislative proposals to amend MiFID by
recasting it as a new Directive (MiFID II) and a new Regulation (MiFIR). The European Parliament
and the Council of the EU (the Council) have been debating the text since then, taking into account the
efforts of the financial services and wider industry to influence the direction of certain provisions.”).
51. Ben Moshinsky, EU Searches for Meaning of Derivative as Rules Take Effect, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 25, 2014, 7:23 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-02-25/eu-searchingfor-the-meaning-of-derivative-as-rules-take-effect.
52. Weadon, supra note 14, at 259–60.
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variations arose in the respective regulatory regimes. It then elaborates on
significant discrepancies between the United States’ and the European Union’s
regulation of derivatives. Specifically, it highlights differences arising from the
varying scopes of Dodd–Frank and EMIR, as well as ones stemming from each
regime’s regulation and treatment of data relating to derivatives transactions.
A. Understanding the Unintended Consequences: Divergences in
Implementation
In Professor Jonathan Wiener’s article on the future of international
53
regulatory cooperation, which builds upon much of his previous work, he
dismisses stereotypes dichotomizing the United States’ and the European
Union’s regulatory regimes. Although Wiener acknowledges differences exist,
he notes that “characterizations of U.S. and EU regulatory systems as sharply
divergent, such as the notion of a precautionary Europe versus a reactive
United States, are exaggerated. The reality of U.S. and EU risk regulation over
the past four decades is overall average parity punctuated by occasional
54
divergences.” This rings especially true in the context of derivatives regulation
because the “European Union and the United States do showcase a high level
55
of commonality in their approach toward derivatives regulation post crisis.”
Thus, the dissimilarities between the United States and the European Union in
their regulation of derivatives are not the result of two regimes that came up
with different answers to the same problems. Rather, the occasionally
conflicting and divergent regulatory regimes resulted from slight variations in
implementation. The Atlantic Council report stresses that these discrepancies
are largely unintended, stating, “[D]espite shared regulatory objectives,
significant areas of divergence are emerging in the implementation process—
differences that have the potential to create high costs for policymakers as well
56
as market participants.”
Various factors explain the current gaps and conflicts between the United
States’ and the European Union’s regulation of derivatives. First, the United
States is a single nation, whereas the European Union must balance the
competing interests of its member states. Because the regulatory bodies of the
European Union garner their authority from member states, their methods of
implementing reform differ significantly because, in some scenarios, these
bodies feel specific discretion or implementation is more appropriately left to
the national governments. In short, the European Union can regulate member
53. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the United States
and Europe, 5 J. OF RISK RES. 317, 343 (2002) (“[E]ven as the US and Europe dispute who is more
precautionary than the other, from a global viewpoint both the US and Europe are probably at the
highly precautionary end of the spectrum compared to the rest of the world. The acrimony over
precaution between the US and Europe may be driven less by real differences over regulatory
philosophy than by a larger contest for great power leadership . . . .”).
54. Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 7, at 114.
55. ATLANTIC COUNCIL supra note 29, at 30.
56. Id.
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states through either regulations or directives. Regulations look like federal
57
statutes and trump state law by “establish[ing] directly enforceable standards.”
They are very detailed and all of the provisions are binding, “immediately
58
becom[ing] part of a national legal system.” A directive, however, is binding as
59
to the result, but not on the courts in the member states. This leaves the means
of achieving the required outcomes up to the states.
This distinction is evidenced within the European Union’s own package of
derivatives regulation, with MiFID II, a directive, and MiFIR, a regulation. The
discretion granted by directives creates the potential for “gold plating,” in
which member countries may impose even stricter guidelines than those
imposed by the European Union. An area of derivatives regulation in which
gold plating is permitted involves the oversight of clearinghouses by member
countries, in which “EMIR provides for the regulation of clearinghouses a basic
minimum set of standards that may be heightened (‘gold plated’), depending on
the jurisdiction in the European Union where the clearinghouse is
60
established.” This ability of member states to independently guide
implementation in certain areas gives rise to conflicts within the European
Union, discussed below with regard to the varying definitions of derivatives
currently existing within the regime.
Although derivatives are uniformly regulated across the United States, a
similar issue arises due to the various agencies involved in the implementation
of the G20 agenda. Former SEC Chairperson Mary Schapiro touched upon the
need for domestic regulatory agencies to cooperate amongst themselves,
stating,
Domestically, the SEC is working closely with the CFTC, the Federal Reserve Board,
and other federal prudential regulators, as required by the Dodd–Frank Act, to
develop a coordinated approach to implementing the statutory provisions of Title VII
to the extent practicable, while recognizing relevant differences in products, entities,
61
and markets. Working closely domestically also helps our efforts internationally.

Disagreements among bodies or states within the domestic regulatory
regime can create gaps in the regulation of derivatives between the European
Union and the United States. The challenges faced by both the European
Union and the United States in achieving coordination and consistency within
57. See Paul M. Schwartz, The EU–U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1971–72 (2013) (noting directives “require member states to enact national
legislation that reflect their principles”).
58. Christopher Kuner, The European Commission’s Proposed Data Protection Regulation: A
Copernican Revolution in European Data Protection Law, 11 Privacy & Security L. Rep. 215, 217
(2012).
59. See Schwartz, supra note 57 (noting directives “require member states to enact national
legislation that reflect their principles”).
60. Id. at 38.
61. Financial Regulatory Reform: The International Context: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 112th Cong. 16–17 (June 16, 2011) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairperson, Sec. Exch.
Comm’n) (speaking on the international implications of the Dodd–Frank Act, specifically regarding the
regulation of OTC derivatives and foreign investor adviser registration), https://www.sec.gov/
news/testimony/2011/ts061611mls.htm.
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their own regulatory regimes highlight the need to take a more nuanced
approach in implementing derivatives reform that goes beyond the mere
mandates set forth by the G20.
Moreover, timing has proven to be a significant issue, with the reforms
agreed upon by the G20 often being passed in one regime before the other,
which leads to regulatory arbitrage and uncertainty for many parties engaging
in cross-border transactions. A recent Economist article discusses the struggling
reform of derivatives regulation and highlights the significance of delays
therein, writing, “Market fragmentation is a worry too. That is mainly because
American regulators—notably the Commodities and Futures Trading
Commission—have moved faster than their European opposite numbers.
Whether and how European firms are to comply with their requirements
62
remains unclear and controversial.” Although the United States has taken the
lead in most areas of reform, which arguably works to the detriment of U.S.
63
parties to derivatives transactions, there are parts of the G20 agenda that
reached enactment in the European Union first. For example, with regard to
64
dark pools, the United States “is still developing its regulations in some areas
covered by MiFID, including for high-frequency trading. In others, such as
65
position limits for commodity derivatives, it already has measures in place.”
Finally, policymakers in the two regimes seemingly approach derivatives
from different angles, as commentators “suggest that US rules appear to favor a
more ‘snapshot’ view of the market and the positions that dealers hold, whereas
66
EU laws prefer to understand the transaction cycle of each swap.” Moreover,
differences in the number and types of agencies leading the reform of
derivatives regulation in the two regimes have also led to varying approaches in
passing legislation, with the United States taking a largely bifurcated approach,
separating tasks between the CFTC and SEC, whereas policymakers in the
European Union “have taken a more piecemeal approach, with various pieces
67
of legislation tackling different goals and objectives.” These inconsistencies
62. Regulating Derivatives: Teething Problems, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 22, 2014, 14:50),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/01/regulatingderivatives?zid=295&ah=0bca374e65f2354d553956ea65f756e0.
63. See, e.g., Weadon, supra note 14, at 259 (“[T]he fact that the United States jumped ahead of
other financial regulators in passing Title VII has created an environment in which differential
regulatory standards in major international derivatives markets will prevail absent international
harmonization of OTC derivatives regulation.”).
64. Dark pools are lightly regulated venues for trading, mostly run by broker dealers, in which the
order of trade is not disclosed and information regarding transactions is only published after the fact.
Scott Patterson, ‘Dark Pools’ Face Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., (June 5, 2013, 9:55 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324069104578527361102049152. These dark pools are an
alternative to exchange trading but are coming under increasing scrutiny due to a lack of transparency
and regulation. Id.
65. Jim Brunsden, EU Lawmakers Seal Deal on Financial Market Rules Overhaul, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 15, 2014, 10:09 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-15/eu-lawmakers-sealdeal-on-financial-market-rules-overhaul.
66. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 35.
67. Id. at 30.
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regarding approach and areas of priority between the two regimes ultimately
are reflected in the legislation, despite the fact that both regimes adhere to the
standards agreed upon by the G20.
This discrepancy in implementation of the G20 standards between the
United States and European Union highlights the limits of the G20, as the
Atlantic Council itself notes: “Importantly, these variations undermine a key
goal of the G20 agenda, namely, the standardization of derivatives dealings to
promote simplicity and a better understanding of the risks of trading these
68
instruments.” The following analysis of the current legislation regarding the
regulation of derivatives in the two jurisdictions thus demonstrates the need for
increased regulatory cooperation and harmonization between the two regimes.
B. Key Divergences in the Regulation of Derivatives between the United States
and the European Union
Before identifying the key differences between the legislation governing the
regulation of derivatives in the United States and the European Union, a
reiteration of the key proposals agreed upon by the G20 leaders will highlight
the room for potential discrepancies in the resulting regulation of derivatives
after domestic implementation. In a response to the financial crisis and the
systemic risk posed by derivatives, the
G20 policymakers have broadly committed to reducing these risks by: (i) mandating
that standardized OTC derivative contracts be traded on electronic platforms and be
subject to central clearing; (ii) increasing capital charges for trades that are not
centrally cleared; (iii) requiring that all derivatives trades be reported to trade
repositories; (iv) obliging market participants to keep adequate capital; and (v)
stipulating detailed business conduct rules to protect derivative counterparties and
69
end-users.

Despite the success of the G20 in coming to an agreement on the most
effective methods of eliminating and controlling the risks posed by derivatives,
the slightest variation in implementing the G20 agenda can lead to conflicting
70
legislation, which in turn creates the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. The
following sections highlight several significant discrepancies between the
United States and the European Union in their regulation of derivatives and
their respective legislation-setting for the G20 standards.
1. Scope
According to the Atlantic Council report, the most significant variation
between the respective directives, regulations, and legislation in the United
States and the European Union is scope: “Despite the similarities in approach,
68. Id. at 48.
69. Id. at 29.
70. See Ben Protess, Official Warns of ‘Regulatory Arbitrage’, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 28, 2011, 6:44
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/c-f-t-c-official-warns-of-regulatory-arbitrage/
(“If financial regulators in the United States and Europe enact conflicting rules for the derivatives
industry, banks and other financial firms will be free to skirt the new rules, Bart Chilton, a
commissioner at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.”).

WHITE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

316

1/8/2016 2:41 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Vol. 78:301

implementation of the clearing and trading mandate has the potential to result
in divergences between the EU and the US regimes. By far the most visible
71
difference has been with regards to scope.”
This varying scope is most evident in the extraterritorial nature of both
72
regulatory frameworks, because the reach of their legislation is premised on
different metrics and circumstances. Under Title VII, the legislation’s
extraterritorial reach is provided under § 722(d), in which “non-U.S. persons
will be regulated if: they have a direct and significant connection with activities
in, or effect on, commerce of the U.S.; or they contravene such rules or
regulations as may be prescribed under the Act, necessary or appropriate to
73
prevent the evasion of the relevant provisions.”
74
The extraterritoriality of Title VII is extremely extensive and is one of the
75
most striking aspects of the legislation; however, EMIR also includes a similar
provision extending its regulatory regime beyond the borders of the European
76
Union. EMIR, per Article 4, regulates OTC derivatives extraterritorially by
applying to transactions “between two entities established in one or more third
countries that would be subject to the clearing obligation if they were
established in the Union, provided that the contract has a direct, substantial and
77
foreseeable effect within the Union.”
Additionally, both regimes allow for substituted compliance in certain
situations. However, the question of whether a local law is sufficient is
determined on a case-by-case basis and left to the discretion of the respective
agency. In the United States, the CFTC determines whether a foreign entity
may solely abide by its local comparable regulatory requirements in place of
78
adhering to U.S. regulations. In the European Union, ESMA is given the
authority to decide “whether a non-EU entity’s local rules are compliant or not,
71. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 36.
72. See Robert Dilwoth et al., Comparison of the Dodd Frank Act Title VII and the European
Market Infrastructure Regulation, 17 MORRISON FOERSTER, (Jan. 28, 2014), http://media.mofo.com/
files/Uploads/Images/140128-Comparison-of-the-Dodd-Frank-Act-Title-VII.pdf (“Both regulatory
frameworks exercise an extraterritorial reach, particularly for mandatory clearing of transactions.”).
73. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 722(d), 111 P.L. 203, 124
Stat. 1376, 1673 (2010).
74. Id.
75. See Weadon, supra note 14, at 267 (“Considering the distinct possibility for disparate
substantive standards and implementation timelines for margin requirements, one of the most striking
aspects of the prudential regulators’ proposed rules on margin requirements for non-cleared swaps is
the extraterritorial reach of the requirements. The proposed rules apply to all swaps transactions of all
non-U.S. subsidiaries and affiliates of any U.S. entity.”).
76. It is worth noting that the European Union enacted Regulation (EU) No 285/2014 on
February 13, 2014 in order to supplement Article 4(1)(a)(v) and to provide “regulatory technical
standards on direct, substantial and foreseeable effect on contracts within the Union.” This text
provides a more comprehensive explanation of what constitutes “direct, substantial and foreseeable
effect within the Union.”
77. Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012
on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, art. 4(1)(a)(v), 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1,
17.
78. Dilworth, supra note 72, at 20.
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and if not the non-EU entity must abide by EMIR standards.” Thus, the
arbitrariness of these determinations by both the CFTC and ESMA opens the
door for even more discrepancies in extraterritorial reach of their respective
legislations governing the regulation of derivatives.
The extraterritoriality of both Title VII of Dodd–Frank and Article 4 of
80
EMIR has resulted in overlapping regulatory regimes, with varying and
inconsistent scopes that consequently create a complex regulatory web for endusers. In addition, this complexity will likely have unintended consequences
that undermine the G20 agenda because“[i]f the conflicting requirements of the
CFTC proposed guidance and EMIR is left unresolved, separate clearinghouses
will necessarily develop for swaps between E.U. counterparties and swaps
81
between U.S. counterparties.” This separation would “reduc[e] netting
opportunities for each class of swap and result[] in unnecessarily burdensome
82
collateral requirements for market participants.”
Moreover, the specific transactions covered and exempted by each provision
vary. The Atlantic Council provides an example of the differing extraterritorial
scope of the United States’ and the European Union’s respective regimes,
noting:
[T]he European Union has not yet determined to what extent foreign exchange swaps
are to be covered by EMIR. But in the United States, foreign exchange swaps enjoy a
specific exemption from mandatory clearing requirements under the DFA and
subsequent Treasury election (DFA, section 722(h)). Without alignment, these
differences in scope can encourage firms to shift their FX derivatives business to the
83
United States as a way to benefit from (potentially) lower compliance costs.

This example demonstrates the discrepancies in scope and the resulting
ambiguity, and it highlights the need for increased regulatory cooperation
between the respective agencies.
In addition to the extraterritorial reach of each piece of legislation and the
ambiguity of both regulatory regimes in extending that reach, the scope of the
two regimes also differ in their levels of detail and complexity attributed to the
various elements of derivatives regulation.
Policymakers have made note of this fundamental discrepancy between the
regulation of derivatives in the United States and the European Union, stating
“the terminology used to define the scope of each regime differs in emphasis,
and it remains to be seen how this divergence will impact future
implementation . . . . While the vast majority of OTC instruments will be
84
regulated by both regimes, differing definitions can encourage gaps.” A
79. Id.
80. Commission on Capital Markets Regulation, Letter on Resolution of Differences Between EU
and US Clearinghouse Requirements, 1–2 (Jan. 28, 2013) (“[T]he CFTC would require a swap between
a U.S. and an E.U. bank to be cleared by a CFTC-recognized clearinghouse, while EMIR would
simultaneously require such a swap to be cleared by an ESMA-recognized clearinghouse.”).
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id.
83. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 32.
84. Id.
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consequence of this inconsistency in terminology is that parties can take
advantage of these differences by renaming or restructuring trades in order to
85
fall outside of the regulatory regime.
To understand the consequences of such discrepancy in terminology
between the United States’ and the European Union’s regulatory regimes, one
can look to the current experience within the European Union. According to
ESMA Chairman Steven Maijoor, as of February 2014, “‘There is no single,
commonly adopted definition of derivative or derivative contract in the
European Union, thus preventing the convergent application’ of the reporting
86
rules within the European Market Infrastructure Regulation.” As a result,
countries within the European Union may use their own definitions until the
Commission adopts a definition, leading to inconsistencies that will inevitably
result in varying regulation of transactions. After all, a “derivative transaction
87
in one country might be considered a simple spot trade in another.”
Another example of the varying scope of derivatives regulation between the
United States and the European Union can be seen in an analysis of actors
covered by the end-user exemptions of the respective regimes. A 2010 Clifford
Chance and ISDA report noted that, despite significant commonalities, this
difference in end-user exemptions is significant: the European Union’s regime is
potentially less burdensome for end-users. In the US, the clearing obligation falls on
everyone who trades an eligible contract. In the EU, the clearing obligation applies to
financial counterparties when dealing with other financial counterparties and
nonfinancial counterparties only become subject to the clearing obligation when their
88
positions (excluding certain hedges) exceed a specified clearing threshold.

This divergence is a leading point of contention among corporate hedgers,
who are attempting to persuade U.S. regulators to exempt their trades, as the
89
European Union has done.
2. Data Sharing and Reporting
An extremely important area of derivatives regulation requiring
harmonization and improved cooperation is that of data sharing and reporting.
90
91
Both Dodd–Frank and EMIR include international data-sharing provisions;
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Moshinsky, supra note 51.
Id.
CLIFFORD CHANCE & INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION,
REGULATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS: A COMPARISON OF EU AND US INITIATIVES, 3
(2010).
89. Matt Cameron & Tom Newton, Pressure Grows for US to Copy EU’s CVA Exemption, RISK
(Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.investmenteurope.net/other/pressure-grows-for-us-to-copy-eus-cvaexemption/.
90. Dodd–Frank added section 21 to the Commodity Exchange Act, which created an entity
tasked with the functions of collecting and maintaining swap transaction data and information, and
which is accessible to certain foreign regulators under specified circumstances. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n, CFTC Votes to Clarify Indemnification and Confidentiality Provisions in the Dodd–
Frank Act, (May 1, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6246-12.
91. In Regulation (EU) No. 151/2013 of 19 December 2012, 2013 O.J. (L 52) 33, ESMA adopted
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however, the lack of mutual recognition among the respective regulators
highlights yet another gap in the G20 agenda. Although G20 leaders agreed
upon an international data-sharing arrangement, a report produced for the G20
in March of 2014 by the OTC Derivatives Regulators Group (ODRG) on
Cross-Border Implementation Issues highlights the continuing inability of states
92
to reach agreements on data sharing.
This limited effectiveness can be attributed to numerous factors, including
varying data quality and accuracy as well as issues surrounding identification of
93
derivatives products. Moreover, “[a]cross borders, some jurisdictions have
been unable to share trade-reporting data with each other because of a host of
94
secrecy and privacy laws.” In the ODRG report, the group’s members state
their preference for regulators to have direct access to relevant data held in
trade repositories in other states; however, the report notes that direct access is
95
unlikely to be currently available in many circumstances. As a result, ODRG
in fact stresses the necessity for transgovernmental networks—direct
communication between the relevant regulatory agency of each country—in the
96
effort to improve data sharing.
In addition to issues with sharing data between the United States and the
European Union, the Atlantic Council report delineates key points of
divergence between the two regimes with regard to data reporting, noting this
inconsistency “relate[s] to differences in: (i) the scope of products covered by
the reporting requirement; (ii) the data that must be provided; (iii) the timing of
97
disclosure; and (iv) the depth and breadth of data publication by SDRs.” An
analysis of the current data requirements illustrates that the European Union
and the United States prioritize different aspects of disclosure. For example,
“while the European Union demands deeper information on swaps trades, the
98
United States is more demanding about timing.” The consequences of such a
discrepancy are significant and can put significant pressure on parties to crossborder transactions, who may have to comply with both regimes and
consequently make more data available immediately in order to adhere to both
Article 3, titled “Third country authorities,” which provides the following: “In relation to a relevant
authority of a third country that has entered into an international agreement with the Union . . . a trade
repository shall provide access to the data, taking account of the third country’s mandate and
responsibilities and in line with the provisions of the relevant international agreement.”
92. See OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS GRP., supra note 28, at 1.
93. Neil Roland, CFTC to Seek Comment Next Week on Improving Derivatives Trade Reporting,
MARKET
INSIGHT
(Mar.
12,
2014,
21:05),
O’Malia
Says,
MLEX
http://www.mlex.com/user/Login.aspx?PubID=513217.
94. Id.
95. OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS GROUP, REPORT OF THE OTC DERIVATIVES
REGULATORS GROUP (ODRG) ON CROSS-BORDER IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 1 (Mar. 2014),
https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/NewsEvents_nr_20140331_odrg-rpt-cross-border.htm.
96. Id. (“ODRG members are discussing access issues on a bilateral basis and will continue to
work to develop practical solutions to trade repository data access issues[,] as authorities in their
respective jurisdictions implement arrangements for the sharing of data held in trade repositories.”)
97. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 34.
98. Id.
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the European Union’s and United States’ regimes, respectively.
Moreover, the derivatives regulation regimes in the United States and the
European Union diverge in their allocation of reporting obligations. In this area
of derivatives regulation, the European Union’s regime imposes a burden on
more of the parties involved in a transaction, and these parties are subject to
higher compliance standards than their counterparts in the United States. This
difference is significant for end-users because
EMIR imposes detailed reporting requirements for the life of the contract, including
any changes that occur to its essential terms. In contrast to the practice in the United
States, the reporting requirement falls on both counterparties, irrespective of whether
their activities exceed the threshold. Though end-users can delegate reporting duties
to a third party, such as a dealer or a prime broker, responsibility for compliance
remains with the end-user and cannot be contracted or limited by the fact of
100
delegation.

By placing the burden of reporting on more parties and not allowing these
parties to delegate their responsibilities to third parties, the European Union’s
reporting obligations are considerably more burdensome, both in terms of
101
potential liability and the cost of compliance.
These discrepancies in data reporting under the United States’ and the
European Union’s derivatives regulatory regimes, and the difficulty faced by
their respective regulators to access each other’s data, illuminate the
significance of transgovernmentalism in the regulation of derivatives. The
intricacies of the information held by the trade repositories within each regime
and the impediments imposed by domestic law protecting data require direct
regulatory cooperation between states. Although the standards set forth by the
G20 set goals for member states, such standards are, on their own, incapable of
covering the loopholes that allowed for the financial crisis in the first place: the
inability to aggregate information across borders in order to better coordinate
regulation and monitor the derivatives market for potential systemic risks.
In order to resolve such deficiencies in the current regulation of derivatives
globally, “[b]ilateral and regional efforts should supplement international
efforts at the G20 and FSB. The most important relationship should be the EUUS regulatory relationship, and both jurisdictions should focus their efforts on
achieving deep consensus with one another as they promote policies
102
internationally.” These transgovernmental networks, especially those between
the United States and the European Union, will further the international
harmonization of derivatives regulation. This will consequently reduce the
threat these financial transactions present to the global economy by preventing
99. Id.
100. Id. at 44.
101. Id. (The report notes that these potential costs of compliance are significant: “The EU regime
does not allow end-users to escape liability for reporting even when they delegate reporting
responsibilities to a third party. Thus, parties remain responsible for their own reporting. This implies
that end-users must develop internal systems for monitoring transactions and for checking the veracity
and accuracy of the reporting undertaken by third parties.”).
102. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 57.
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the fragmentation of information so that regulators can better anticipate
systemic risk.
V
CONSEQUENCES OF AN UNHARMONIZED REGULATORY REGIME OF
DERIVATIVES: HIGHLIGHTING THE NEED FOR HARMONIZATION
The global nature of derivatives and the financial innovation that
accompanies these instruments make the derivatives market highly susceptible
to regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, the resulting concentration of risk poses a
threat not limited to those financial institutions required to adhere to a stricter
regulatory regime. The current lack of international harmonization poses
serious risks, especially for the United States, because there exists
a very real possibility that the exploitation of “regulatory arbitrage” opportunities
created by the first-mover position of the United States will: (1) place U.S.-based
banks at a competitive disadvantage with their non-U.S. competitors; and (2) increase
the global risk posed by OTC derivatives as origination and trading migrates to
103
jurisdictions with less burdensome regulations.

Although the lack of harmonization between the United States and
European Union regulatory regimes does immediately affect participants,
because “[t]hese varying requirements and approaches create a challenging
terrain for companies seeking to participate in the world’s vast derivatives
104
markets,” the most significant threat resulting from divergences in regulation
is a potential repeat of the 2008 financial crisis. As discussed in part III, multiple
factors contributed to the global crisis, but a central cause was the inability of
states and international organizations to coordinate the regulation of highly
complex financial products internationally, and subsequently, to aggregate data
that could help regulatory agencies better analyze the risks to the global
economy.
Unfortunately, the deficiencies that led to the financial crisis in 2008 remain
largely unaddressed. Current “differences in international rules are leading to a
culture that addresses compliance rather than addresses risk, in which
international banks spent too much effort on ensuring they were compliant with
105
regulators in different jurisdictions.” This emphasis on compliance with the
multiple regulatory regimes arising in the aftermath of the crisis is likely to
result in increased regulatory arbitrage, and this regulatory arbitrage
consequently results in a concentration of risk, which makes the global
economy more susceptible to systemic failure. The solution, therefore, is
increased international regulatory cooperation and the ultimate harmonization
of derivatives regulation.

103.
104.
105.
(Mar.
deal/.

Weadon, supra note 14, at 251.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 46.
David Bannister, CFTC Calls for International Swaps Data Sharing Deal, BANKING TECH.
26, 2014), http://www.bankingtech.com/211252/cftc-calls-for-international-swaps-data-sharing-
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This part, addresses the most troublesome and prevalent consequences of
the current unharmonized state of derivatives regulation. The discrepancies
between the United States’ and the European Union’s regulation of directives
have resulted in an increased cost of compliance, duplicative regulations,
inconsistent data on derivatives transactions, and uncertainty among users of
cross-border derivatives. These effects are largely interrelated, and the majority
will be addressed in the context of regulatory arbitrage and the resulting
concentration of risk—two consequences that the harmonization of derivatives
regulation would specifically eliminate.
A. Regulatory Arbitrage: The Search for the Most Hospitable Regime
Following the financial crisis of 2008, states and international organizations
responded in typical fashion: by amplifying regulation. The increase in
regulation of the derivatives market, described above, not only reformed the
regulation of products already under the supervision of regulatory agencies, but
also brought financial products and transactions previously conducted in the
dark under the auspices of regulatory agencies. A resulting spike in the cost of
compliance for many financial institutions ensued because a significant number
of parties must comply with duplicative regimes due to the extraterritorial reach
of Title VII and EMIR either due to uncertainty as to which regime’s regulation
106
actually applies or because the parties truly fall under the scope of both
regulatory regimes. The current uncertainty surrounding compliance
significantly burdens parties to cross-border transactions. When “faced with the
potential for dual regimes to apply, end-users might consider establishing
processing systems that collect, collate, and organize data in accordance with
107
two separate reporting regimes.”
Regardless of whether parties abide by multiple regimes as a result of
uncertainty or duplicative regulatory regimes, the result for all parties to crossborder transactions is an increased cost of compliance. This consequent rise in
the cost of doing business means that parties will seek out jurisdictions with the
most friendly compliance regimes in order to attain a competitive edge. This
phenomenon, known as regulatory arbitrage, is particularly prevalent in the
108
109
case of derivatives due to their sensitivity and global nature.
106. A recent Atlantic Council report highlights how prevalent this uncertainty is among end-users,
especially in the cross-border context, by providing the following example:
Take the case of a large, multinational auto manufacturer or coffee company that uses
derivatives to hedge its risks in the foreign exchange, commodities, and interest rate markets.
As an end-user, this company must first determine the legal regime that applies to its
derivatives trades. This could be surprisingly complicated, especially if the company trades
different types of derivatives through subsidiaries located in different jurisdictions as well as
with counterparties situated outside of their home jurisdictions.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 46–47.
107. Id. at 44–45.
108. See id. at 34–35. The report explains that, due to the sensitivity of OTC derivatives,
parties may seek out ways to avoid the full weight of reporting- and data-publishing
requirements. In such cases, parties may seek to book trades through the European Union,
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CFTC Commissioner Chilton warned of the possibility of regulatory
arbitrage resulting from inconsistencies between regulations in the United
States and the European Union, stating, “Dodd–Frank loses its authority at the
United States border, and if the European rules are weaker than the law,
110
derivatives trading is likely to shift overseas.” Chilton’s predictions were
realized: following the implementation of Dodd–Frank in the United States,
parties to derivatives transactions immediately began to participate in
regulatory arbitrage at the expense of U.S. corporations.
In a recent article, Tom Osborn surveyed end-users in order to gather their
opinions on recent reforms. A telling response that demonstrates the increase in
regulatory arbitrage among parties came from a representative at the Scottish
investment company Scottish Widows, who stated,
We have no interest in being CFTC-registered, until we either have to or want to.
Fortunately we don’t have any bodies in the US. But as the survey shows, who we deal
with in Europe has become important—making sure you’re dealing with a bank’s
European entity, not their US entity, for example. It’s modestly reduced the number
111
of counterparties we can deal with.

According to Osborn’s article, this response to U.S. regulations of
derivatives seems increasingly prevalent, with almost fifty percent of non-U.S.
respondents admitting to actively avoiding U.S. counterparties and with others
reporting that U.S. firms and U.S. affiliates of non-U.S. firms have been denied
112
access to certain non-U.S. platforms. These effects of regulatory arbitrage are
quickly felt, as evidenced by ISDA data in a Wall Street Journal article from
March 2014, in which Andrew Ackerman noted, “Activity between European
and U.S. dealers in euro-denominated interest-rate swaps fell to about 10%
from an average of 25% following the implementation of CFTC’s swap trading
113
rules in October . . . .”
The significant regulatory arbitrage parties engage in as a result of
regulatory divergences demonstrates the need for the harmonization of
derivatives regulatory regimes. This need for improved regulatory cooperation
to counter regulatory arbitrage is stipulated in Senator Charles Schumer’s letter
to Chairman Ben Bernanke, in which Senator Schumer urged the Chairman “to
work closely with [his] international counterparts to ensure that they adopt as

where at least for the moment, data is reported by T+1, and thus they benefit from delays in
dissemination of the information.
Id.
109. See id. at 40 (“The global nature of OTC derivatives has led some end-users to seek
competitive markets and tailored derivatives contracts outside of their home countries and
currencies.”).
110. Protess, supra note 70.
111. Tom Osborn, Counting the Cost of Reform—ISDA End-User Survey, RISK (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2335033/counting-the-cost-of-reform-isda-end-user-survey.
112. Dilworth, supra note 72, at 55.
113. Katy Burne & Andrew Ackerman, CFTC Close to New Rules for European Swaps Trading,
WALL ST. J., (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304688104579
467680559144744.
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rigorous a regulatory regime for the over-the-counter swaps markets . . . .
Ideally, those rules would perfectly mirror the U.S. rules. This would minimize
the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage by non-U.S. customers of U.S.
114
entities.”
Senator Schumer’s letter focuses on the competitive disadvantage of U.S.
corporations due to regulatory arbitrage and how this shift away from the
115
United States poses a real threat to the U.S. economy. The most damaging
effect of parties taking their derivatives transactions outside of the United
States, however, is the resulting gap in the derivatives regulatory regime. The
current lack of harmonization pushes these transactions into the most lenient
jurisdictions or outside of the regulatory context entirely, impeding the
effectiveness of regulatory bodies to aggregate data. As Professor Schwarcz
notes: “Complexity is the main cause of financial information failure. . . .
Regulatory arbitrage increases complexity as market participants take
advantage of inconsistent regulatory regimes both within and across national
116
borders.”
B. The Concentration of Risk
The rising cost of compliance, due to both uncertainty and duplicative
regimes, and the resulting regulatory arbitrage as companies seek a competitive
advantage, have led to increased concentrations of risk. The pooling of risk is
most notable in three specific areas: (1) those jurisdictions lagging behind in the
implementation of the G20 agenda; (2) clearinghouses that can afford to comply
with both the United States’ and the European Union’s regulatory regimes;
and, (3) most controversially, those areas that evade oversight by regulatory
regimes.
As discussed above, derivatives transactions are becoming more
concentrated in certain regimes over others. This trend is particularly evident in
the United States since Title VII led the charge in the implementation of the
G20 agenda. A specific example in the United States is the exemption of nonU.S. swaps operations, which encourages U.S. financial companies to “shift the
117
bulk of their swaps trading activity to more hospitable jurisdictions.” This shift
is problematic as it may “result in the concentration of financial risk in
jurisdictions with the most favorable regulatory regime as companies exploit the
118
regulatory arbitrage opportunity presented by disparate regulations.”
114. Letter from Charles Schumer, U.S. Senator, et al., to Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Board of
Governors
of
the
Federal
Reserve
System,
et
al.
(May
17,
2011),
http://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/ny-lawmakers-urge-regulators-to-reconsiderderivatives-rule-that-would-hurt-us-competitiveness.
115. See Weadon, supra note 14, at 272 (“[I]t is clear that removing the attendant risks of
regulatory arbitrage will be integral to the success of Title VII and the long-term health of the U.S.
financial services industry and the U.S. economy as a whole.”).
116. Schwarcz, supra note 30, at 818.
117. Weadon, supra note 14, at 271.
118. Id.
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Although the current shift has been largely away from the United States, the
European Union is also losing derivatives transactions as a result of regulatory
arbitrage. The growing tendency of parties to seek jurisdictions outside of the
reach of Title VII and EMIR will ultimately negatively impact both the ability
of regulators to effectively regulate these transactions and the markets
themselves, because “[w]hen end-users shift hedging activities to a single
market, they can generate concentrations of risk in a single jurisdiction. This
impacts liquidity and market competition, and it also increases the cost of
119
capital.” Although the United States and the European Union still account for
120
the majority of derivatives trades and transactions, this shift to more
hospitable jurisdictions will only increase if harmonization between regulatory
regimes is not reached, since emerging markets will strive to attract more
121
business, and other players, such as China, will continue to attempt to assert
themselves as financial leaders.
In addition to this concentration of risks in certain hospitable jurisdictions,
the discrepancies in regulatory regimes are also leading to a concentration in
the number of clearinghouses that service cross-border swaps. Duplication
raises costs for clearinghouses, which means that only those clearinghouses with
the financial ability to comply with multiple regimes will be able to participate
in the cross-border market, ultimately concentrating risk and potentially leading
to an AIG-type situation in the future. Seen by G20 policymakers as the
solution to many of the problems in the OTC derivatives market,
122
clearinghouses are facing a surging volume of transactions.
Although
123
clearinghouses were not intended to eliminate all risk, rather, just to
concentrate it into fragmented parts in order to prevent systemic risk, Professor
Schwarcz notes this “standardization can backfire” because “Dodd–Frank’s
clearinghouse requirement might inadvertently increase systemic risk by
124
concentrating derivatives exposure at the clearinghouse level.” Derivatives
specialist Wallace Turbeville also highlights this unintended consequence,
noting that “[t]he fear is that we have not eliminated systemic risk, merely
125
concentrated it.” As clearinghouses continue to grow in size and cover a
growing percentage of transactions, they begin to present a similar
concentration risk to AIG in the years leading up to the crisis.
119. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 43.
120. Burne & Ackerman, supra note 113 (“Analysts and data providers have not provided figures
showing how much of the $693 trillion global swaps market has migrated to Europe from the U.S., but
observers said the swaps market is divided roughly with 40% in the U.S., another 40% in Europe and
20% in Asia.”).
121. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 53 (“[T]he largest banking system in the world now
resides in China, not in the United States or Europe.”).
122. The Risk in Clearing-Houses: All Clear?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 7, 2012).
123. Wallace C. Turbeville, Derivatives Clearinghouses in the Era of Financial Reform, THE
ROOSEVELT INST., 2 (Oct. 24, 2010), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/sites/default/files/wpcontent/uploads/2010/12/derivatives_clearinghouses_in_the_era_of_financial_reform.pdf.
124. Schwarcz, supra note 30, at 820.
125. Turbeville, supra note 123, at 14.
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Although clearinghouses that must abide by duplicative regulatory regimes
arguably provide a higher level of overall protection—one regime’s regulation
may be stricter and fill the gaps of the other—this duplication may “ultimately
discourage some firms from using some clearing services. Furthermore, market
participants might be incentivized to develop financial products that evade the
126
clearing requirement.” The cost of compliance may push market participants
to create products that evade clearinghouse services, which clearly undermines
the original intent of G20 leaders in requiring the clearing of derivatives
transactions.
The most concerning consequence of these concentrations of risk in more
hospitable jurisdictions, in larger clearinghouses providing cross-border
services, and in areas that evade regulatory oversight is that they impede the
ability of regulatory bodies to aggregate data and protect against future
systemic risk. This divergence “exerts increased pressure on regulators to
establish mechanisms to share data and to develop communication channels to
127
alert others of risks accumulating in cross-border derivatives markets.”
All of the unintended consequences of the discrepancies between the
regulatory regimes of the United States and European Union, such as increased
costs of compliance, duplicative regimes, inconsistent data on derivatives
transactions, uncertainty among users of cross-border derivatives, the shift of
transactions to most hospitable jurisdictions, evasion of regulation, and
concentration of risk, are interrelated. Together, they amount to an enormous
threat to global financial stability and demonstrate the need for harmonization
of derivatives regulation if the United States and the European Union hope to
prevent a crisis similar to the one experienced in 2008.
VI
HARMONIZING THE REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES: IMPEDIMENTS TO
REGULATORY COOPERATION AND THE PATH FORWARD
Before the harmonization of derivatives regulation between the United
States and the European Union can be achieved, their respective regulatory
agencies must be aware of the impediments they face. This part makes note of
difficulties that arise in coordinating uniform regulations of derivatives in the
two regimes. Despite these challenges, it highlights the current progress of
international regulators in cooperating with each other, both in the context of
the relationship between the United States and the European Union as well as
globally. Finally, it addresses arguments against the harmonization of
derivatives regulation among jurisdictions, noting that these critiques should act
as a caution and provide guidance to regulatory agencies in their bilateral
communications.

126. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 39.
127. Id. at 34.
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A. Impediments to Harmonization
The difficulties in coordinating the implementation of the G20 agenda
among the member countries and the European Union demonstrate that,
despite the extent to which certain regulatory bodies desire international
cooperation, achieving this harmonization in practice can be extremely difficult.
In their article on international regulatory cooperation (IRC) in this
symposium, Professors Alemanno and Wiener highlight several of the factors
that impede the ability of regulatory bodies to coordinate, including
fears by some interest groups that IRC will mean harmonizing down (a race to the
bottom), and fears by other interest groups that IRC will mean harmonizing up (a race
to the top); restrictions on sharing information across countries or agencies; limited
agency staff and resources; and pre-existing statutes, both substantive . . . and
procedural (regarding administrative procedures such as transparency, confidentiality,
128
notice and comment, stakeholder input, executive review, and judicial review).

These constraints all damage the current attempt to harmonize the
regulation of derivatives between the United States and the European Union.
First, politicians and regulators looking to prevent a repeat of the 2008 financial
crisis and regulate systemic risk fear that international regulatory cooperation
in the areas of derivatives may lead to a race to the bottom. Although “for the
most part American regulators, like their counterparts overseas, have stuck to
129
their guns,” it is acknowledged that international cooperation does lean
toward less stringent regulations. As the following statement by Treasury
Secretary Jack Lew highlights, “We will not let the pursuit of international
130
consistency force us to lower our standards.”
Wiener and Alemanno also listed constrained resources as an explanation
for difficulties in achieving international regulatory cooperation, and U.S.
derivatives regulators undoubtedly agree. In fact, this lack of funding and
resources is a current focal point of the CFTC, which argues “that it needs more
resources because its responsibilities have grown tremendously. It has written
more than 60 rules over the past three years and the agency now oversees the
131
vast swaps market, which was previously unregulated.”
Moreover, restrictions on sharing information across countries are a serious
impediment in the context of derivatives regulation. This constraint is
specifically daunting for regulators on either side of the Atlantic because of the
meaningful substantive differences between the two regimes with regard to
data:
EU actions have focused on individuals’ rights of confidentiality, and emphasized a
single framework across countries to protect personal data. US policy, by contrast, has
been influenced by a focus on the rights of free speech and different national and state
responsibilities, resulting in a multi-layered framework that emphasizes enforceable
codes of conducts, disclosures, and opt-out rights in select sectors, including financial

128.
129.
130.
131.

Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 7, at 13.
Financial Fragmentation: Too Much of a Good Thing, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 12, 2013).
Id.
Chon, supra note 2.
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132

Thus, this divergence in the regulation of data and their different priorities
regarding the protection of data makes the sharing of information between the
United States and the European Union a current focal point in conversations
between their respective regulatory agencies. According to Scott O’Malia,
removing this impediment to harmonization is a top priority of the CFTC, as
evidenced by his recent “call[ing] on counterparts in Brussels to focus on
recognizing each other’s swaps data warehouses and develop a means to share
trade information. He has asked that Europe and the US should harmonise the
133
form and format of data being reported.”
Moreover, differences in procedure and the implementation of regulations
between the United States and the European Union also pose challenges to
harmonization, as discussed above. The bifurcated approach of the United
States, separating the derivatives regulatory regime between the CFTC and
SEC, influences the approaches of regulators and, consequently, affects the
implementation of reform. Additionally, the use of both directives and
regulations in the European Union is a significant and unique attribute of its
regulatory regime, and the discretion given to member countries through
directives leads to both technical and substantive differences in regulations
within the European Union.
B. The Common Path Forward for the United States and the European Union
In order to counter these impediments to regulatory cooperation, on July
11, 2013, the European Commission and the CFTC published a memo in which
134
they agreed to reach a “Common Path Forward on Derivatives.” In this
publication, European Commissioner Michael Barnier and CFTC Chairman
Gary Gensler “acknowledged simultaneous application of EMIR/Title VII
135
could lead to conflicts of law, inconsistencies and uncertainty.” In this
agreement, the two leading regulators noted that a key step in achieving the
desired harmonization is to provide deference to each other on a territorial
136
basis, sharing the view that “jurisdictions and regulators should be able to
defer to each other when it is justified by the quality of their respective
137
regulation and enforcement regimes.”
Although this agreement acknowledges the vital importance of
transgovernmental networks in the regulation of derivatives internationally and
132. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 50.
133. Philip Stafford, CFTC and Treasury Share Swaps Resources, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 25, 2014,
8:28
PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3387ecc6-b452-11e3-a09a00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2xwdZtAbL.
134. Press Release, The European Commission and the CFTC Reach a Common Path Forward on
Derivatives (July 11, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-682_en.htm?locale=en.
135. Dilworth, supra note 72, at 20.
136. Id. at 29.
137. Press Release, The European Commission and the CFTC Reach a Common Path Forward on
Derivatives, (July 11, 2013) (on file with the CFTC).
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sets a significant precedent for other regulatory regimes to follow, the
challenges discussed throughout this article demonstrate that much work still
needs to be done by both the United States and the European Union in order to
eliminate the consequences resulting from the current discrepancies in
regulation. Unfortunately, substituted compliance and foreign recognition are
not sufficient remedies in the derivatives context; instead, the regulatory
agencies of the United States and the European Union need to pay extremely
close attention to the nuances of their respective regulations and the potential
unintended consequences of their implementation methods in order to achieve
harmonization.
C. Current Progress Internationally
Although this note stresses that the need for international harmonization is
particularly pressing in the U.S.–EU context due to the concentration of
derivatives trading in these two regulatory regimes, this focus does not mean to
downplay the ultimate call for the harmonization of derivatives regulation
globally. Ultimately, effective regulation relies on a global network of
regulatory agencies that operate on the same page, as Chilton notes, “Whether
trading occurs in Hong Kong, London or New York, to the extent practical,
there needs to be global regulatory harmonization. While important to ensure
national interests, without appropriate harmonization of rules, a virtual
138
regulatory race to the bottom could occur.” Although some argue that the
G20 set the foundation for harmonization, true global harmonization can only
be achieved through direct communication between regulatory agencies of the
various regimes. Evidence of this type of bilateral regulatory cooperation does
exist in transgovernmental networks other than that between the United States
and the European Union. Patrick Pearson, the head of financial markets
infrastructure at the European Commission, highlights the relative success of
global derivatives regulation, stating,
We talk to each other. There’s a group set up between regulators including Japan, the
US and Europe, and it’s doing a good job—its first report is being published soon,” he
said. “The group meets three or four times a year, and I’ve had weekly phone calls
from them. I’m encouraged; I’ve never seen this level of cooperation between
139
different global regulators before. We are ensuring rules around the world match up.

Pearson’s positive evaluation of current progress is not unfounded. The
focus of the G20 and local regulators, however, still needs to shift away from the
standards-based approach, which cannot on its own achieve harmonization, and
needs to look instead towards improving the transgovernmental networks of
different national regulatory agencies in order to iron out the creases in
implementation that ultimately lend themselves to regulatory arbitrage and
concentrations of risk. Professor Randall Korskzner from the University of
Chicago Booth School of Business stresses this necessary shift in approach,

138. Chilton, supra note 1.
139. Bannister, supra note 105.
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noting, “Global standards and approaches to regulation need to focus more on
removing risk from the financial system rather than just compliance—but to do
so international regulators will need to harmonise their efforts and embrace
140
technology to a much greater degree.”
Moreover, G20 leaders and members of the ODRG are becoming
increasingly aware of the limitations on their ability to harmonize derivatives
regulations as international organizations. Significantly, recent summits in
141
142
September and November of 2014 addressed the cross-border issues that
require changes to domestic legislation and the need for increased bilateral
143
This focus on transgovernmental
negotiations among member states.
networks is the necessary next phase of derivatives regulation.
VII
A LACK OF HARMONIZATION ON THE NEED FOR HARMONIZATION
Despite the detrimental consequences resulting from discrepancies in
derivatives regulation, there are still critics of the harmonization framework.
These arguments against harmonization largely stem from three different
theories. One belief, held by several academics and regulators, argues that
harmonization will result in weaker regulations globally and, consequently,
increased risk. Another line of reasoning finds harmonization impossible, and
therefore, a wasteful pursuit. The third and least compelling line of reasoning,
as evidenced throughout this note, is that the regulation of derivatives does not
144
require uniformity.
145
146
Although harmonization is frequently not desirable, the qualities that
140. Id.
141. See REPORT OF THE OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS GROUP (ODRG) ON CROSS-BORDER
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES supra note 96 (“For the September 2014 Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors meeting, the ODRG will report to the G20 on further progress in resolving crossborder implementation issues, including identification of any cross-border issues that cannot be
resolved without legislative change.”).
142. See id. (“For the November 2014 G20 Leaders Summit, the ODRG will report how it has
addressed or intends to address the treatment of branches and affiliates and organised trading
platforms and implementation of the trading commitment and a timetable for implementing these
approaches.”).
143. See, e.g., id.
ODRG members agreed to continue bilateral negotiations of MOUs between regulators to
take into account local specificities, while leaving flexibility for ad-hoc arrangements between
regulators. It was agreed that the bilateral negotiations should consider appropriate
involvement of the local authority, such as notification, regarding direct access to information
of foreign registered entities in the supervisory context and on-site examinations.
Id.
144. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 48 (including the opinion of “an industry association [that]
noted . . . international consistency does not require uniformity but an appropriate level of similarity,
comparability and predictability of regulatory outcomes across jurisdictions”).
145. Schlosser & Bull, supra note 22.
146. See Raustiala, supra note 8, at 7 (listing the three key factors driving transgovernmentalism:
“the expansion of domestic regulation, increased economic interdependence, and technological
innovation”).
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have led to transgovernmental networks and increased regulatory cooperation
are explicitly evidenced in the derivatives context, making harmonization
desirable. Recently, Benoit Coeure, a member of the European Central Bank’s
governing board, explained why uniformity is in fact desirable in the context of
international financial activities, noting “[i]f you have an idiosyncratic local
legal environment, then market participants will find it safer just to play on
their home turf because of the legal uncertainty that goes with international
147
activities, and we’ll lose the benefit of international financial integration.” The
other two main arguments against harmonization, however, provide insight into
the challenges that confront the harmonization of regulation and provide
regulatory agencies with important considerations when interacting in
transgovernmental networks.
A. Harmonization and the Possibility of Weakened Legislation
The argument that harmonization of regulation internationally will result in
weaker legislation and potentially concentrate risk is noteworthy in that it
provides a warning for regulators currently working together to remove the
inconsistencies in their respective legislation and regulatory regimes. A report
by the OTC Derivative Regulators Group highlights this perspective, noting,
“Two academics suggest that if jurisdictions face significant limitations in their
ability to reach agreement, harmonization efforts might lead to agreement on
148
only weak global standards.” Moreover, total harmonization could reduce the
flexibility of regulators to respond to local differences that will inevitably arise
149
among jurisdictions. This inability to respond flexibly to differences and the
harmonization of the regulatory network also poses a threat in that it “could
cause financial institutions to behave in the same way and unintentionally
150
concentrate risk (for example, holding the same types of assets).”
B. Is Harmonization Possible?
Another critique of the harmonization of derivatives regulation is that it
simply cannot be done. According to some policymakers, “The global
harmonization of all aspects of financial regulation cannot be achieved. Many
elements of financial stability and customer-protection policy can be
determined locally. Some competitive distortions and opportunities for
151
regulatory arbitrage will remain inevitable.”
These critiques of harmonization highlight potential impediments to and
consequences of the harmonization of derivatives regulation; however, rather

147. Financial Fragmentation: Too Much of a Good Thing, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 12, 2013).
148. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 47–48.
149. See id. at 48 (noting that an academic interviewed for the article argued “harmonized
regulations across all jurisdictions may provide a level playing field but could be problematic, in part by
not providing jurisdictions flexibility to respond to their differences”).
150. Id. at 48.
151. Stephan, supra note 20, at 202.
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than serving as discouragement, these perspectives should act as a warning to
regulators in their current transgovernmental discussions. Harmonization
should not come at the expense of the necessary level of regulation. Moreover,
regulators in harmonizing their regulatory regimes need to pay close attention
to the potential unintended consequences of standardized regulation in order to
prevent potential concentration of risks that could result from financial
institutions centering on, for example, certain products or only operating via
specific cross-border clearinghouses.
In order to effectively carry out the mandates of the Common Path
152
Forward, regulators in the United States and the European Union should take
pains to understand these critiques and the existing impediments to
harmonization discussed above. As part IV demonstrates, achieving effective
harmonization in the regulation of derivatives requires more than abidance to
standards. Regulatory agencies must understand the nuanced differences in
their respective regulatory regimes and search for the functional equivalents in
procedure that will allow them to uniformly implement regulations that will
prevent regulatory arbitrage and, to the best of their ability, the concentration
of risk in order to prevent the threat of systemic risk that derivatives are wont
to pose.
VIII
CONCLUSION
The dark side of an increasingly global economy exposed itself in 2008 with
the financial crisis. Overnight, governments and financial institutions became
acutely aware of the repercussions of the same technological innovation that
was praised for easing this globalization, and as a result, businessmen and
regulators alike admitted the need to increase and improve regulation. This
need for increased regulation was particularly noticeable in the derivatives
market due to the widespread, global effects and rapid technological innovation
of derivatives transactions and products, a deadly combination that makes
derivatives particularly threatening to the global economy. The immediate
response of the G20 allowed the international organization to successfully reach
an international consensus on required reforms and pinpoint the standards that
should rule derivatives in the future. However, the key to effective regulation of
derivatives lies in the transgovernmental networks between the national
regulatory agencies responsible for implementing reform. This shift from a
global, standards-based approach to bilateral regulatory cooperation is critical
in preventing another similar crisis in the future and for the effective oversight
of the global derivatives market. As discussed throughout this note and
exemplified in the analysis of the United States and European Union, slight
divergences in domestic regulatory regimes lead to fragmented blocks of

152. As discussed above in part IV.B, the Common Path Forward is the publication set forth by the
CFTC and the European Commission in which the two regulators noted the need for harmonization.
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information regarding derivatives transactions, in addition to regulatory
arbitrage and the concentration of risk in hospitable jurisdictions and dark
pools.
Today’s most significant and influential transgovernmental network in the
derivatives context is the one connecting the regulatory agencies of the United
States and the European Union, the two regimes that account for the vast
majority of derivatives transactions. The recent implementation of G20
standards by the two regimes has highlighted the need for harmonization and
increased communication between their respective agencies: slight variations in
their regulatory regimes have led to unintended consequences that undermine
the G20 standards and fail to eliminate the systemic risk posed by derivatives
transactions. Although the Common Path Forward acknowledges this
deficiency and demonstrates a commitment for increased regulatory
cooperation, regulators in both the United States and the European Union
need to understand the impediments to harmonization and the potential
unintended consequences of their respective domestic legislation in order to
effectively reach uniformity in their regulation of derivatives.
Despite this note’s specific focus on achieving harmonization between the
United States and the European Union, ultimately, regulatory agencies globally
will need to find a uniform approach to the regulation of this market, as other
regions, most notably Asia, garner a bigger portion of all derivatives
transactions and become financial leaders alongside the United States and
Europe. The threats of regulatory arbitrage and the concentration of risk,
however, are most notable today as a consequence of the discrepancies between
the regulation of derivations in the United States and European Union. Thus,
current efforts looking to prevent the systemic risks and financial crises
resulting from derivatives transactions must shift from the international, Group
of Twenty context and instead focus on the bilateral regulatory cooperation of
the Group of Two: the United States and the European Union.

